The Impact of Government on the Economic Status of Black Americans by James J. Heckman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS
OF BLACK AMERICANS
James J.Hecknan
Working Paper No. 2860




This paper is part of NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions
expressed are those of the author not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #2860
February 1989
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS
OF BLACK AMERICANS
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews recent evidence on black economic progress.It
notesthat while relative status increased over the period 1965-1981,
absolutedifferentials in real earnings between blacks and whites widened
over this period. The paper goes out to summarize recent studies of the
impact of government on the economic status of black Americans. Educational
policy has a strong effect. The evidence on affirmative action programs is
mixed. There is an intrinsic bias in the methods used toward finding no
effect of affirmative action programs. Selection bias effects do not
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This paper discusses the status of black Americans and the role of
government in determining that status. The prevailing attitude of society
toward this issue- ..assuming that the Reagan administration represents the
prevailing view--is very different from the attitude of the Johnson
administration that was in office in 1965 when much civil rights legislation as
enacted.
In 1965, there was a genuine enthusiasm--widely held--about thewiLlingness
andcapacity of America to solve its domestic problems using government prog:a.ms
of various kinds. Poverty and the unequal economic status of minorities--in
particular black Americans- -were perceived to be pressing but solvable social
problems.
In 1965, faith in the lessons of social science and the possibilities of
social intervention was widespread. This faith had an apparent factual basis.
Economists took credit for the successful Kennedy tax cut of 1962 which
1This paper extends the Twenty Eight Annual Abbott Lecture which I gave a:
Colorado College on April 17, 1985. I am grateful for coents received from
my colleagues Joe Hotz and Bill Wilson. This research was supported by NSF
Grant SES 8107963.
1stimulated the sluggish economy. They proclaimed that this success gave
tangible evidence of a new era in which they could "fthe-tune" the economy and
was viewed as the social science counterpart of the critical experiment in
science.
Subsequent events have shown how false this view was but in 1965 there was
real optimism. Society could solve its problems-- in particular it could solve
the problem of the inferiority of blacks in the American economy.
The Kennedy-Johnson administration launched a War on Poverty. Many civil
rights bills were passed and executive orders issued. The main features of the
civil rights activity were:
(1) The 1964 Civil Rights Bill and related bills banning discrimination in
employment, housing and voting. "Equal treatment of equals" became
embodied in the law and voting rights were assured.
(2) "Affirmative action" programs for employment of minorities were
begun--initially among larger firms and federal contractors. These
programs encouraged firms to employ minority workers. This policy was
instituted in recognition of the difficulty in overcoming historical
discrimination patterns.
Coincident with this activity was a coitment to a War on Poverty which
had two main thrusts:
(1) Efforts were made to improve the skills of poor blacks (and other poor
people) through (a) expansion of manpower training programs and (b)
direct intervention in ghetto schools via bussing, through head start
programs and the like.
(2) Many transfer programs were introduced or expanded. These programs
were designed to transfer income to the less fortunate. By virtue of
their more lowly position in the distribution of income, blacks were
disproportionately represented in these programs. The mix of social
2sp.nding shifted from training to transfers after initial dissatis-
faction with the results of training programs.
Just as many economists took credit for the post-1962 improvement in the
American economy, many social scientists proclaimed success for the Kennedy-
Johnson policies aimed at elevating the economic status of blacks. At first
glance, the evidence seemed clear. Although aggregate parity had riot been
achieved, at least for black males, the social statistics seemed to indicate the
initial success of the new programs.
The first indications suggested that these programs "worked." Consider,
for example, Figure 1. This figure shows three curves placed on the same
diagram. These three curves trace out the ratio of the median income of black
males, white females and black females, respectively to white male median income
for full-time workers. Median income is the income that a person in the middle
of an income distribution earns.
These figures tell an interesting story. The uppermost curve reveals a
near stability in the black male income/white male income ratio pre-1965- -1965
was the date that much of the Civil Rights legislation became operative- -anda
sharp upward jump after 1965. The lowest curve in that figure- -for black
females--tells a similar story for that group.
Table 1 demonstrates the significant breakthrough that occurred in the
occupational position of employed blacks. The proportion of the black workforce
in the professional category expanded greatly. Measures of occupational
similarity between blacks and whites show substantial unprecedented improvement
in the period 1960-1970.
Even more dramatic was the breakthrough in black employment in traditional
segregated industries.
Figure 3 displays the share of total employment held by white maleswhite
females, black males and black females in the South Carolina textile industry
3eve: tzie per.Oj-iQ.Fne textile industry is the largest industrial
employer in the state. Total employment itt the industry continued to expand
until the mid 70's. Its racial employment pattern is typical of that of many
"traditional" southern industries. Skill requirements are low in the industry.
There is a large black population in the state- -both relatively and absolutely--
throughout thisperiod.
The topmost curve or line in Figure 3 displays the share of total
employment held by white males. The curve or line second from the top displays
the share of total employment held by white females. The bottom curve presents
the share of black females and the curve just above it presents the share of
black males.
It is evident from this char: that the share of white males is roughly
constant at 60%. It declines during World War II but is offset by an expansion
of white female employment.
Through two World Wars, the Korean War, the 1920's boom and the Great
Depression the proportion of blacks itt the industry is low and stable. The
black female share is virtually zero. For black men the share is less than 10%
despite the fact that the black share in the total population is closer to 40%.
In the post 1965 Vietnam era, textile plants were natural targets of
federal contract compliance programs. Sales to the federal government in the
form of materials for uniforms and the like were sizable. (The total volume of
sales to the government by South Carolina firms increased from $20,000,000 in
1965 to roughly $120,000,000 in 1966 as the Vietnam build up began). In many
counties of the state, textile employment was the principal industrial
employment and was a visible target for federal civil rights activity. The share
of black employment--and the level--increased dramatically after 1965. By 1970,
the industry was roughly 30% black whereas before 1965 it was less than 10%
black. While especially dramatic, the story of the textile industry is fairly
4cypLcaJ. o ocrier "traditional" southern industries. Penetration rates for
blacks rose. Moreover, as black political power rose as measured by
registration in the South, so did black employment in government (Table 2). It
is this and other evidence that led many scholars of American racial relations
to declare the success of the Kennedy-Johnson policies. Richard Freeman of
Harvard wrote in 1973 that
While black-white differences have not disappeared, the convergence
in economic position (of blacks) .. . suggestsa virtual collapse in
traditional discriminatory patterns" (Freeman 1973, page 67).
He continues on in the same article to write
Much of the improvement in black economic position that took place
in the late 60s appears to be the result of governmental and related
antidisciminatory activity associated with the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.. .More education for blacks and the general boom of the period
cannot account for the sharp increase in relative incomes and
occupational position of blacks after 1964. (bc. c.t. ,page119)
Writingin Commentary magazine in the same year- -1973- -Benjamin Waccenberg
and Richard Sca=on described the success of the Kennedy-Johnson social program
in the following terms:
.A better deal has been given to the poor andblackto the point
where many of them are now in the middle class just as the Presi-
dential pledges and legislation promised....Tobe sure, we
cannot say absolutely that the legislation was totally respor.sible
for the progress made but we can say absolutely that it was crucial.
Liberalism worked. (ac:enberg and Scammon, 1973)
From the perspective of 1985 these claims seem exaggerated to some and
absurd to others. Writing in 1984 in an influential book that has been
described as the "Bible of the Second Reagan Administration" conservative author
Charles Murray writes in his influential book Losing Crour.d that
5As tneSturm undDrangof the 1960's faded and we settled into
the 1970s, the realization gradually spread things were getting
worse, not batter, for blacks and poor peoplein this country...
the inner cities were more violent and ravaged than ever
before.. .it was difficult to take much satisfaction in the legal
edifice of black rights when teenage unemployment was approaching
40 per cent. (page 145, Losthz Ground)
Elsewhere in his monograph he writes
If an impartial observer from another country were shown the
statistics on the black lower class from 1950 to 1980 but given
no information about the contemporaneous changes in society or
public policy, the observer would infer that racial discrim-
ination against the black poor increased dramatically during
the late 1960s and 1970s (Losinz Ground, page 221)
The consequences of (affirmative action] were disastrous...
for poor blacks especially. (Losing Ground, page 223).
Summarizing his study, he recoends
My proposal. .. isto repeal every bit of legislation and
reverse every court decision.. .(sothat] we are back on
the track left in 1965. (Losing Ground, page 223)
In his work, Murray cites evidence of the failure of schooling and training
programs and warns of the incentives to fail built into manysocial programs
that require a person to be poor in order to qualify for their benefits.
Murray's assessment of the position of poor blacks--if not his policy
conclusions- -isshared by such liberal black scholars as W. Wilson of the
University of Chicago, who writes
Since 1970, both poor whites and nonwhites have evidenced
very little progress in their elevation from the ranks of
the underclass. (Wilson, Declining Significance of Race,
page 154)
He writes of a polarization in the black community with a prospering upper
class and an i.mmiserated lower class. Wilson's view is widely held in the black
community.
There is some evidence that supports this less optimistic view of black
status. Co back to Figure 1. The lower right hand side of that figure shows
that the absolute difference inincomefor all minority groups taken with
6espec: o n.ce ma4.es an measured n inflation constant dollars widened in the
60s. The gap remains sizable today. Figure 2 presents this evidence in a
different way and reveals that while black incomes rose, so did white incocies
and absolute gaps did not converge between racial groups.
Figure 8 is a key exhibit in this article. It charts the growth over tiie
in the labor force dropout rate- -those not looking for work or at work- -among
prime age males 25-54. This age group has traditionally had a near zero rate of
dropping out of the work force. For both race groups, the dropout rate has
grown but the rate of growth has been much more rapid for blacks. By 1982,
fully 12% of prime age black males in the civilian population were not attached
to the work force.
A complete accounting of the status of blacks must reckon with this
phenomenon. A recent history of black progress that focuses only on the
improvement of demand conditions in the labor market for blacks cannot account
for the growth in black dropout rates. These figures are mirrored in high and
growing unemployment rates for blacks of all ages.
Not only is this dropout phenomenon a potential sign of distress in the
black communitybutitalsosignals the possibility of an important problem cha:
arises in comparing the earnings and occupational positions of blacks with
whites. Earnings and occupation data are only collected for labor force
participants. More precisely, the published wage and salary data count only
those persons employed in one year who were also employed in March of the
following year. As the fraction of blacks in the labor force declines and as
more blacks enter the unstable marginal worker category and are excluded from
the standard statistics, the available evidence on black status becomes
increasingly unreliable since more blacks than whites are entering marginal
status. One theme of this paper is that a substantial portion of the measured
relative wage growth of black males is due to their differential rate of
7om.ss1.on trom cne pubi.snec stac.sCi.cs.flie omitted worers are the Low wage
workers and the growing rate of omission of blacks relative to whites has led to
an artifical acceleration in the measured rate of black progress. Iii short, the
"evidence" cited by Freeman and Watcenberg and Scammon is flawed.
There are ocher signs that all is not well in the black community. Table 6
gives statistics on the real income gap between black and white families. It
has grown in absolute terms since 1959 and the ratio has barely changed. This
phenomenon arises in part from the growth of female headship among black
families coupled with the near constancy of real incomes in black female
households.
Although the percentage of blacks living in poverty has greatly decreased
since 1959, a substantial portion of this decline is due to increased cash
transfers and not the growth of employment income. As transfer programs began
to be cut back in the Carter administration in 1977, the proportion of blacks
living in poverty began to increase.
-
Differentscholars looking at different measurements of black economic
status currently hold widely divergent views on the efficacy of policy. As
recently as March, 1985 in an issue of Public Interest, Freeman continues to
argue chat affirmative action plans have "worked." Other scholars, such as
Finis Welch of UCLAarguejust as vehemently that they have not.
This lack of agreement in the research community inspires little confidence
in the public at large. It is disappointingly coon to observe disagreements
among social scientists over issues of public policy. The confidence of the
citizen in social science has diminished greatly since 1965. To empirical
social scientists who believe that data can be used to settle rather inflame
controversies, the apparent divergence between conflicting views on the role of
government is very disturbing.
Overstatement and oversimplification ar. well rewarded activities both
8inside and outside of academic life. Simple monolithic stories in which
government does good or evil are easily grasped and attract political and
financial support from partisan groups. The incentives for telling such stories
are strong and the public has difficulty in assessing their merit because of the
lack of access to data and the complexity of the statistical methods required to
analyze it.
The rejection of social science knowledge on this issue is premature.
There is real knowledge about the impact of government on black status butthe
correct story does not accord with the simplistic ones told in the popular press
or by the "think tanks" of the right or left whose commissioned authors
selectively read the data to suit their purposes.
There is also real ignorance, however, that remains to be filled by better
studies. Separattng out fact from fiction is an essential, if tedious, aspect
of making studies of the impact of government on the status of blacks an
intellectually respectable activity.
When we confine ourselves to the available data and recognize how it is
generated and what it really measures and when empirical realities are separated
from theoretical possibilities a richer, more ambiguous, picture of the role of
government on the status of blacks emerges than is portrayed •in the popular
literature.
In the rest of this paper I want to separate out hard knowledge from
circumstantial knowledge and no knowledge at all.I want to stick to the facts
and attempt to separate out hard empirical evidence from a rioristic reasoning
that dominates many popular social science discussions.
I hope to convince you that contrary to the popular view there is a valid
empirically based social science. In addition, I want to demonstrate the
importance of understanding how the data used in recent discussions are
generated.
9In making comparisons between black and white incomes and black and white
occupational status of the sort presented in Figures 1 and2,and Tables 1 and
2, it is important to notice that these are derived for workers in the labor
force.
An important but neglected feature of the social statistics of the sort
used in the recent debate over the effects of policy is that since the mid-60s,
black participation in the civilian labor force has been declining. Figure 8
documents that the dropout rate for blacks has been increasing at a more rapid
rate than for whites. By 1982, more than 12% of prime age black males are not
in the work force and do not contribute to the earnings statistics used to
measure black progress. The difficulty with the published statistics cited by
Freeman and others is that they exclude such individuals.
This exclusion is in addition to the now widely acknowledged urtdercount of
blacks- -especially poor blacks- -which has attracted considerable attention in
the literature and is the basis for the recent city of Detroit suit against the
U.S. Census. (See the discussion in the Journal of the American Statistical
Assocatiott, vol. 80, *398, pp, 98-132, March, 1985). There is growing evidence
of an undercount of blacks, especially economically marginal blacks.
As previously noted, this decline in black prime age male labor force
activity taken in isolation appears to be anomalous- -especially in view of
monolithic stories that speak of the decline in the U.S. discriminatory system
engineered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If market
opportunities were expanded for blacks they surely should have expanded their
labor force activity--yet black labor force activity declined, even for prime
age males.
One explanation of this decline that receives strong theoretical but mixed
empirical support in the literature is that the decline in black male labor
force activity is linked to the growth in the benefits from a variety of social
10ez ogras :a: ac.e no: or.ng a sore a:::ac:i.ve a.:erna:.ve :nan
working, especially for low wage individuals.
The War on Poverty stressed Job training but italsooffered enhanced
income transfers. Benefits for all sorts of social programs exanded
dramatically as Figures 9 and 10 and tables 3 and 6 reveal. Some of these
programs discouraged labor force activity. Participation in disability payments
programs- -given to individuals who suffer from work related disabilities- -
expandedgreatly as benefit levels rose and eligibility standards were lowered.
(SeeTable3). Participation in these programs was proportionately higher for
blacks than whites given the position of blacks in the income diszrbution.
These programs probably have had some effect on dIscouraging labor arke:
activity, but the precise magnitude of their effect is not known. Reinforcing
this effect (but on much shakIer empirical grounds) is the hypothesized effect
of the minimum wage on disemployment. The real minimum wage grew in magnitude
through the late 60's and early 70's.
-
Howeverachieved, the removal of poor blacks from the statistical base car.
and does lead to an easily misinterpreted narrowing of measured black-white
income differences. The remaining working blacks ay appear to grow in ecor,orni
status relatIve to whites not because any single black s doing better but
because low wage black males are removed from the statistics.
This account of recent history does not deny that there has been real
growth in black status relative to white status but it does argue that
measurements of the growth may be exaggerated. Reinforcing this story from the
other side is recent evidence of growing nonreporting of income by higher income
people in the statistics which constitute the base of our knowledge. Only 2% of
interviewees failed to report income in 1947 but 28% failed to report in 1982
and nonreporting rates are highest in the high income occupations. (See
Lillard, Smith and Welch, 1986) Standard imputation procedures have been shown
11to produce a downwardbias inestimated income for such people. Because
proportionately more whites are in such occupations, this factor leads to
"convergence" thatmaywell be spurious.
How serious is this issue? Like so much in social science, the issue is an
empirical one. I:isa hard problem that has not received adequate attention.
In some eariLer work with Richard Butler of Brigham Young University (Butler and
Heckinan, 1978) I estimated a sizeable role for such statistical phenomena. The
most recent published study of this problem is one by Charles Brown of the
University of Michigan. (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984). Brown uses now
conventional statistical methods to correct the wage data for the effect
ofundercountirtg low wage black dropouts. Without going into the details of his
study, I direct you to Table 5. Brown reports both published black-white median
earnings for male workers over 16 and corrected estimates. His nunbers are
given in columns 1 and 2 in Table 5. In 1965. the ratio of black median
earnings to white median earnings is .576--corrected for selective removal of
low wage blacks the ratio is .558--little different.
Now go on in that table to 1975. In that year measured black-white median
earnings is .734--a growth of .734- .576 —.158points--a 25% gain. How much is
the real relative standing of blacks, correcting for labor market dropouts?
Turn tocolumntwo. Brown estimates this figure at .614. Correcting for labor
market dropouts, the growth in black/white median income is only .614- .558 —
.056.Two-thirds of the measured gain is due to an underaccouncing of poor
blacks .Brown'sresearch suggests that the evidence of Table 1 may not be due
to the decline of discrimination as much as to the elimination of the poor from
the statistics of wage earners.2
2
The main point of Brown's paper is to demonstrate that 100% of the black wage
growth is not due to the labor force withdrawal of blacks. His estimate of
66% seems a bit high but even at half that figure the effect of black
12Vi.wing th. data in this light suggeststhat theremaybescope for both
thepolarization hypothesis for the lowertail of theblack income distribution
and the affirmative action hypothesis at the upper tail. In fact, this story is
consistent with the view that scholars like William Wilson have put forth.
(Wilson, 1980) This point has relevance for the most recent analyses of black-
white status such as the one presented by Reynolds Parley in his recent book
entitled Blacks and hices. (Farley, 1985) Virtually all of his analysis of
black-white differences is conducted for samples of workers. Fancy tests and
rejects Wilson's polarization hypothesis.
Hisclaimis premature. By failing to account for the substantial missing
lower tail of the black poor, he fails to find any evidence of a worsening in
the status of poor blacks and he overstates the rate of improvement of the
economic status of black Americans.
I do not want to exaggerate the importance of the labor market dropout
hypothesis by claiming that this phenomenon constitutes the entire explanacon
for the measured convergence in black-white status.
The South Carolina data previously cited (Figure 3) surely indicate a
positive effect of federal policy on black employment and there are numerous
other examples. Richard Freeman's research on black professionals and the work
of his students document both the prevalence of affirmative action programs and
their impact in publicly sensitive large corporations (Leonard, 1983).
Tonetheless itisvery easy to overstate the evidence in support of any
quantitatively significant impact of such programs on the mass of black
Americans. Indeed,manycompetent scholars--such as Finis Welch of UCLAand
James Smith of the Rand Corporation- -claim that there are measured effects of
such programs on black wages although there are documented instances of some
withdrawals on estimated wage growth would be substantial.
13z-ms :esponc1g ;o .-ecera. pressure. SmL;r an ieicn, 1978).
The difficulty with interpreting the available evidence on the impact of
affirmative action is the inherent ambiguity of the data. There have been many
recent analyses of the impact of federal contract compliartce programs which
monitor the performance of required affirmative action programs for federal
contractors. For example, analyses of the effect of federal contracting on
black status typically consist of a comparison at a point in time between firms
with government contracts and those without. Small positive effects of firm
contract status on minority employment and occupational upgrading have been
found but it is difficult to evaluate this evidence and translate it into
measured aggregate wage or employment gains. This is so for three reasons.
First, one theoretical reason for suggesting an upward bias in such
estimates is that firms are connected through a common labor market. If a
contractor firm bids for black labor in an attempt to meet a federally mandated
target, its actions may simply reshuffle blacks between contractors and
noncontractors. If all the gains in contractor firms are at the expense of non-
contractor firms, comparisons at a point in time will overstate true gains. In
the limit, if no black workers are attracted into the workforce as a consequence
of these programs, a comparison between contractor firms and noncontractor firms
may show a big contrast in the employment of blacks in the two sectors when
nothing but a rearrangement of a fixed workforce has occurred. This argument
suggests that comparisons between contractor and noncontractor firms at a point
in time may drastically overstate the true effect of such programs on
employment.
Second, if all firms are bidding for contracts and the receipt of a
contract is partly a matter of luck and there are many opportunities to bid for
such contracts, and if it is costly to hire and fire workers--as much evidence
suggests it is (see Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon, 1960)--all firms--
14contractor or not- -would look pretty much alike at any point in time even though
all were hiring more blacks in response to affirmative action programs.
Comparisons across firms at a point in time would understate true affirmative
action effects. Given the costs of hiring and firing, the second story appears
to be more plausible than the first.
Following firms over time might provide a better answer- -but this is easier
said than done. The problem in social statistics is that a lot of things are
going on in any socioeconomic time series and it is difficult to isolate the
impacts of a few programs.
Third, and more cogently, there are few good measures of affirmative
action. Many time series studies following firms, states, or the country as a
whole over time, use a post-1964 time trend to measure affirmative action. The
time trend is a possible stand in for a variety of factors; the evidence on the
impact of affirmative action is largely anecdotal. The best summary of our
knowledge- -despite all of the claims pro and con- -is that we still do not know
the aggregate effect of these programs.
Unfortunately, the incentives to take a position on such a controversial
subject are so great that the popular literature provides numerous conflicting
stories. The truth of the matter, however boring it may be, is that there is no
solid empirical evidence of harm from affirmative action- -as Murray contends- -or
of great benefit either, as Scammon and 'at:enberg or Freeman contend. The most
accurate si.umary of our knowledge is that we do not yet know.
Neither the affirmacve action hypothesis of government impact nor the
transfer program induced labor force dropout hypothesis can account for the
regional income data displayed in Figures 4-7. Examination of these data
illustrates a danger of using highly aggregated data and the benefit of
considering more closely the constituent portions of an aggregated series.
The pattern of relative income growth for males that emerges from these
15figures is asfollows.
(1) In the Northwest and West regions of the United States as defined by
the Census, there is no clear pattern of growth in relative incomes
(Figure 4. and Figure 6).
(2) In the North Central region there is a blip upward in the 1965 period
that vanishes by the lace 70s.
(3) The only steady upward trend for blacks in any region is in the South.
The uzregate 1965 blio is a consecuence of a North Central blip suverimosed
on Southern trend. The story for the South is particularly important because
more than 50% of the black population lives there. The regional pattern for
women is similar, except that for women, the ratios are above I- -suggesting
superiority for black women- -in all regions but the South long before 1964.
The "transparent" post-1965 shift in aggregate earnings so obvious in
Figure 1 that has been the focus of so much of the discussion on relative black
status vanishes in the regional d.ata. The Southern growth of black status
begins before any 1ennedy.Johnson era legislation waspassed--certainly before
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A main finding of recent scholarship is that the story of black wage growth
is predominately aSouthernstory. Migration per sehasplayed a small role.
We are justbeginningto understand the sources of the improvement of black
economic position in the South. The sources appear to be three in number:
(1) A decline in agriculture and a monetization of normarket activity
(people buying eggs rather thanraisingtheir ownchickensetc.) as
the Southern black population moved from the farm to urban and small
townlabormarkets at a disproportionately faster rate than whites.
Some of the decline in agriculture caused workers to drop out of the
work force as agriculture in the South mechanized (partly in response
to labor saving technical change).
16(2) Growth in industry in the South. A surprising statistic to many is
that in 1980, South Carolina is the state with the highest proportton
of its work force in manufacturing. In joint work (}iec1an and
Payner, 1985) we have documented that newer firms and industries
entering the South in the 1950s in response to taxincentivesand
cheap labor were color blind in their hiring practices. However, the
quantitative importance of this growth on wages and employment has not
yet been determined.
(3) Better investigated is the role of governmentally supplied education.
(See Smith, 1984, Welch, 1974) The recent convergence of black-white
education ratios is phenomenal by historical standards. Look at Table
7 .Theleft hand stde of the table records the years of birth of
various cohorts of individuals and the mean schooling levels of each
cohort. For example, white men born between 1906-1910 received 9.72
years of schooling on average- -black men received almost 3½ years less
schooling on average. The differences in years of schooling- -white
minus black--are recorded for each sex group in Table 8. The
narrowing of these schooling differences is monotone until the pertod
of Jim Crow legislation in the South (1886-1915). Then the difference
stays constant until we reach the cohorts born in late 1910s or early
1920s. Afterward convergence in the black-white educational
distributions is rapid.
The story of the educational disparity between blacks and whites is a
fascinating one. beginning in the late 1880s and culminating in the early
1910s, blacks (89% of whom lived in the South) were effectively eliminated from
the political system. With their elimination from political life came a
reduction in access to governmental services. In the South at that time these
services were primarily schooling services. (See J.M. Kousser 1974)
17This period of exclusion was precisely the period in which Southern public
schooling was being developed. The Plessy .Fergusondecisionof 1896
sanctioned "separate but equal" schools. In reality the schooling was not equal
and ironically only became so at the time of the 1954 Brownvs.Topeka Board of
Educationdecision. Tables 9 and 10document this inequality. Blacksschools
met for fewer daysperyear (panel A, Table 9, 97 days for blacks vs. 143 days
for whites in 1929-1930). Classroom size was bigger, teacher salaries lower,
and pupil expenditures were lower in black schools--look at panel C.
Particularly eye-opening is Table 10 which documents the discrepancy
between black andwhiteper pupil schooling expenditure in school year 1908-1909
in Mississippi.Cohorts born during the peak of the JimCrow era(1886-1915)
did not experience any convergence in years of schooling completed. In
addition, each year of schooling was less valuable for blacks because there was
less teacher input and fewer schooling days in more crowded schools.
These cohorts of black workers dominate the aggregate statistics on
earnings until recently. James Smith (1984) argues thatpartof the post 1964
convergence of black/white status is due to the retirement of these cohortsof
poorly educated workers from the labor force. These cohorts dominate the data
until thel960s. This retirement phenomenon was particularly pronounced in the
South and helps explain the Southern time series growth.3
Part of the Southern storyofwage convergence then, is a storyof
foverrmental discrimination by states with long lasting consequences. Although
this hypothesis cannot explain the "jump"inthe aggregate data that has been
the object of so much analysis,it isimportant to recall that the "jump"goes
awayin the regionaldata exceptin the North Central region.
This is myinterpretation andnot Smith's. Smith doesnotperform an analysis
of regional aggregates.
18Although the history of exclusion of blacks from schooling is a sorry one,
the evidence assembled by Smith is fundamentally optimistic. His evidence
contradicts- -albeit by a negative example- -theclaims of Freeman and Murray that
government educational policies have had little effect on black status. Over
the longer run, they have an important effect.
Let me conclude by summarizing the main points of this paper.
(1) Government has had an impact on the status of blacks and its impact
has not always been negative. The evidence clearly shows that
educational policies toward blacks have played an important role in
elevating the economic status of blacks over time. The evidence on
the importance of training and education on black status is not as
inconsequential as many would have it.
(2) Some policies have had unintended negative effects. The available
fraentary evidence suggests that some transfer programs may have had
the negative effect of removing labor force incentives and stimulating
the formation of female headed families.
(3) Very little reliable information is available about negative or
positive effects of affirmative action programs on the status of
blacks. Our evidence on this issue is at best anecdotal.
(4) A major theme of this paper is the importance of looking closely at
the d.ata introduced into popular discussions and examining how they
have been generated. The aggregate statistics on the time series of
black status mask important regional differences and obscure
developments in the South which have played and continue Co play an
.mportanc role in elevating the status of blacks. The evidence from
the South indicates that naive claims of the importance of the 1964
Civil Rights Acts do not receive support in the data since wages began
to systematically increase in the region long before passage of this
19law. We have also seen thatthesystem of social statistIcs frcm
which we draw our data on black status do not properly account for
lower wage blacks. Part of the measured convergence of black status
to white status (in relative terms) is simply due to the face ch:
poor blacks have been eliminated from the social accounti.ig system.
This evidence casts a very different light on the recent measured
convergence.
Finally,
(5) There exists no satisfactory monolithic overriding explanation of the
recent economic history of black Americans. Current claims in the
popular literatureabout the netgood or evil of government programs
arenot based on firmempiricalevidence.
Government activity has played an important, but notexclusl;e,
rolein shaping black economic status. By no means has it always been
harmful.And 'whenit has been harmful- -as in the case of the
exclusion of black from Southern schooling- -thepolicylessons tobe
drawnindicate a real potential for interventions with positive
effects.
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Percentage of Eployed BlackMales(Fourteen Years Old andOver)
in Major Occupations in 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970
Occupation 1940 1950 1960 1970
Professional and :echrical1.8 2,1 4.6 7.0
workers
Proprerors, managers, and1.3 2.2 1.9 3.0
off icals
Clerical, sales, etc 2.0 4.3 6.8 10.2
Craf:sen, foreert, etc. 4.5 7.8 10.7 15.2
OperacLves 12.7 21.3 26.6 29.4
Service workers and 37.1. 38.4 38.1 38.4
Farm workers 41.0 24.0 12.3 4.4
Source: u.S.Bureauofthe Census, Census of the Population: 1940,
Carac:ertstcsof the Nonwhite Popula:on by Race, Table 8; Census of the
Population:1930. vol.4, SpecialReports, Nonwhite Population by Race,
Table 9; Census of the Population: 1960, Subject Reports, Nonwhi:e Population
by Race,FinalRetort PC(2)-IC, Table 32; CensusofthePopulation:1970,
Subject Reports, FLna1 Report PC(2)-L3, Negro Populacon, Table 7.
23Table 2




Whit. 58,023,795 51,055,70288.0 6,968,09312.0
Zlack 6,622,768 5,743,06486.7 879,70413.3
All 64,646,563 56,798,76687.9 7,847,797 12.1.
Workers
1970
Whit. 69,402,115 58,594,92284.4 10,807,193 15.6
Slack 7,403,056 5,822,39078.6 1,580,66621.4
All 78,805,171 64,417,31283.9 12,387,85416.1
Workers
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Proportion of n aged 25—54 out of the labor force, by race, 1959—1982
(datastandardizedby age).
Source:U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics, iandbook of Labor Stacistics 1978,













































































































































































































































No. of Total No ofNuiber ofAFDCFamiliesasa
FamiliesRecipients ChildrenPercent-age of All
Families
(l,000s) (1,000s) (1,000s)
1950 651 2233 1661 1.66
1951 592 .204]. ..L523 .1.48
1952 596 1991. 1495 1.47
1953 547 1941 1464 1.34
1954 604 2173 1639 1.47
1955 602 2192 1.661 1.44.
1956 61.5 2270 1731. 1.4.3
1957 667 2497 1912 1.53
1958 755 2486 2181 1.73
1959 776 2946 2265 1.75
1960 803 3073 2370 1.78
1961 916 3566 2753 2.01
1.962 932 3789 2844 2.01
1963 954 3930 2951 2.03
1964 1012 4219 3170 2.13
1965 1054 4396 3316 2.30
1966 1127 4666 3526 2.32
1967 1297 5309 3986 2.64
1968 1522 6086 4.555 3.04
1969 1975 7313 5413 3.69
1970 2552 9659 . 7033 4.95
1971 291.8 10651 7707 5.62
1972 3122 11064 7983 5.86
1973 3156 10815 7813 5.80
1974 3323 1.1022 7901 6.04
1975 3566 11401 8105 6.40
1976 3585 11203 7909 6.37
1977 3547 10780 7372 6.25
1.978 3488 10349 7226 6.10
1.979 3560 10379 7207 6.16
1980 3841 11102 7600 6.37
Source forAJ'DCdata; For1950-70, MSTJS H346-367: fr 1971-80, SAUS-31,
TabLe559, ax coarable tables in earlier issues. ?erentage of all







1953 0.596 0.576 0.485 0.626
1934 0.568 0.567 0.447 0.562
1933 0.588 0.596 0.433 0.552











1959 0.580 0.542 0.532 0.642
1960 0.399 0.563 0.503 0.626
















1965 0.576 0.558 0.575 0.708
1966 0.394 0.562 0.643 0.777
.967 0.639 0.612 0.703 0.830
1968 0.664 0.627 0.721 0.838
1969. 0.666 0.625 0.792 0.904
1970 0.663 0.612 0.849 0.957
1971 0.673 0.595 0.860 0.928
1972 0.681 0.614 0.935 1.015
1973 0,695 0.615 0.896 0.934
1974 0.709 0.594 0.977 0.992
1975 0.734 0.614 0.973 1.011
1976 0.700 0.591 1.014 1.002
1977 0.705 0.605 1.009 1.016
1978 0.713 0.616 1.010 1.010
Source: C. 3rowi, Ouar:erlv :our.aL ,f EcQnprnics,1984.
31Table 6










as % of 'hje
1959 $14,301 $ 7,587 $6,714 53.1%
1982 $18,502 $10,277 8,275 53.3%





Source: tJ.S.5ureauofthe Census, Census of Populacion: 1960, PC(2)C.
table14; Current ?ou1ation suev,ser. 2-60,no. 0, :ables 2 an A-'...— —
— —
Figure 11
R.cio OfBlack To White Median Income
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1930 193 1960 1973 1950 192Table 7










1951-54 12.64 11.82 12.70 12.24
1946-50 12.68 11.93 12.45 11.86
1941-45 12.32 11.23 12.14 11.33
1936-40 12.00 10.46 11.81 10.89
1931-35 11.69 9.78 11.52 10.37
1926-30 11.38 9.11 11.33 9.37
1921-23 11.14 8.44 11.12 9.03
1916-20 10.74 7.65 10.79 8.36
1911-15 10.15 6.75 10.36 7.70
1906-10 9.72 6.26 10.02 7.16
1901-05 9.19 5.72 9.43 6.46
1896-1900 8.74 5.42 8.96 6.03
1891-95 8.18 4.96 8.42 5.52
1886-90 7.74 4.72 8.11 5.13
1881-85 7.56 4.38 7.95 4.57
1876-80 7.44 4.11 7.38 4.27
1871-63 7.22 3.36 7.58 3.59
1866-70 7.07 3.06 7.43 2.89
pre-1863 6.76 2.37 7.13 1.99
Source: Smith, 1984
34Table S
Racial Differences in Mean Schooling Levels
(Addi:iorial Years of Schooling of thices)






















CoparisoflS of Tenicieth Cericu Trends in Characteristics
Between the Segregated Negro Schools, Southern ni:e Schools
AndAllU.S. Schools
A. Days acrerided arid enrollment per reacher. A comparison of
segregated Negro schools to ocher schools 1900-1954
Year Average Days Ac:ended Pupils Enrolled per
per Pupil Enrolled Classroom Teacher
Negro All Negro All







1919-1920 80 121 36.0 31.8
1929-1930 97 143 43.7 30.0
l939-l90 126 152 45.3 29.0
1949.1950 148 13 33.6 27.5
1953-1954 151 139 32.9 27.9
5. EnroLlmentofpublic school s:',.Ldencs
retention rates for







Rcio of Erirol1enc in
Firs: to Second Grade
Negro All
Schools Schools
1899-1900 31.9 20,6 1.37 1.14
a
1908-1909 28.7 19.2 1.43 1.9
1919-1920 36.8 22.9 1.96
1929-1930 34.4 16.2 2.35
1939-1940 26.0 11.9 2.03 1.29
1949-1950 19.3 12.6 1.62 1.20
1953-1954 16.5 1.27 1.45 1.25
36Table 9 (Continued)
Comparisons of Twenitieth Century Trends in Characteristics
Between the Segregated Negro Schools, Southern tjhite Schools,
and All U.S. Schools
C. Teacher salaries and expenditures per pupil in average daily
attendance.
Annual Expenditures
Years Salaries per Pupil
Southern Southern
Negro Thize All Negro hi:e ALL
Schools Schools Schools Schools SchoolsSchools
1899-1900 $ 23/mo.S 37/mo. — $ 3 $ 12 S
1908-1909 $ 26/mo.S 49/mo. 9 25
1919-920 $36/mo.$ 73/mo. $ 871/yr. 43b 1929-1930 1,420/yr. 15 49 87
l939-l90 601/vt. 1.046/yr.l.4l/yr. 19 59 88
1949-1930 2,143/vt. 3.OlO/y. — —
1953-19342,861/vt. 3.384/yr. 3.825/yr. 110
209
264
D. Teacher salaries and expendi:res: ratios ofNegro schoolsto
southern white schools (computed frompanel C).
Annual Expenditures








Sources: U.S.Office of Ea:ion,5iennialSuzey of Education:r. :ne Un:ed
States."Statistics ofStateSchool Systems." various issues. Earlier eci::or.s
are by theBureau of Education in :e Department of the Interior.) S:a:e
Superintendentsof Education, Annual Reports, various states, various :ears. and
DavidBlose,Stacis:ics ofthe Education of Negroes,"'.S. Office ofEducaiOrt,
bSouthern white schools only
Refersto1931.1932 instead of 1929-1930.
Instructional expensesonly.
37